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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal courts recently have renewed the debate concerning whether a person can sue a state government or its instrumentalities for copyright infringement. The question presents a clash
of fundamental constitutional principles between the copyright
and patent clause,' whose purpose is to promote the free flow of
ideas by rewarding creativity,' and the eleventh amendment,
whose primary purpose is to protect the federal form of government by insulating states from suit in federal court.4 The Copyright Act of 1976 (the 1976 Act)' and its predecessor, the Copy1. The copyright and patent clause provides: "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985)
(recognizing that "[t]he monopoly created by copyright ... rewards the individual author
in order to benefit the public") (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 429 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
3. The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
4. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3145-46 & n.2 (1985)
(noting that "the Eleventh Amendment implicates the fundamental constitutional balance
between the Federal Government and the States"); Note, Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman: Federal Equity JurisdictionRestricted by Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 16 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 149, 158-60 (1984) (asserting that the states, in ratifying the eleventh amendment, guaranteed federalism by "prevent[ing] the federal government, through
its courts, from interfering in state governmental functions"). But see Atascadero, 105 S. Ct.
at 3150-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (holding eleventh amendment doctrine not based on
principles fundamental to federalism); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,83 COLUM L. REv. 1889, 1894 (1983) (arguing that the
eleventh amendment is merely a "narrow and technical redefinition of the two jurisdictional
clauses of article III ....
The amendment did nothing more than amend article III, section
2 of the Constitution to eliminate the power of federal courts to hear suits against states in
which the sole basis for jurisdiction" was the presence of a diverse party); Fletcher, A Historical Interpretationof the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L.
REv. 1033 (1983). See generally Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U.
COLO. L. Rav. 139 (1977).
5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).

1987]

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

right Act of 1909 (the 1909 Act),6 grant copyright proprietors
"exclusive" rights in their works. 7 While 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) grants
federal courts exclusive subject matter jurisdiction to entertain actions concerning copyright infringement,8 the eleventh amendment
generally prohibits suits in federal court against state governments." Thus, absent a waiver or other abrogation of eleventh
amendment immunity, 10 a proprietor's rights in a work apparently
are not always exclusive; in effect, the owner is required to share
his copyright if the infringer is a state government or its
instrumentality.
The resolution of this question necessarily requires an examination of two constitutional issues. The first issue is the extent to
which a state impliedly waives its eleventh amendment immunity
from suit in federal court by engaging in a federally regulated activity.11 The United States Supreme Court first enunciated the implied waiver doctrine in Parden v. Terminal Railway.1 2 Federal
courts traditionally have interpreted Parden to mean that Congress may condition a state's participation in certain federally reg3
ulated activities, such as the operation of an interstate railroad,'
upon the state's waiver of immunity to potential private suits in
federal court. In a copyright infringement suit, however, it is un6. Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, revised by Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982
& Supp. III 1985). The 1909 Act continues to govern works created before passage of the
.1976 Act. For purposes of this Recent Development, citations to 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 will
refer to the 1909 Act, and citations to 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 will refer to the 1976 Act.
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982) (stating that "[tihe district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents....
[or] copyrights . . . . Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states").
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (holding that "an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought
in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state") (quoting Employees v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973)). A state
agency may be adjudged an "alter ego" of the state and, thus, receive eleventh amendment
immunity. See King v. Caesar Rodney School Dist., 396 F. Supp. 423, 425 (D. Del. 1975).
10. A state may waive its eleventh amendment immunity either expressly, see Clark v.
Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883) (express waiver by appearance in court), or by implication, see Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (implied waiver by participation in
federally regulated activity). See generally Note, Express Waiver of Eleventh Amendment
Immunity, 17 GA. L. REV. 513 (1983); Comment, Implied Waiver of a State's Eleventh
Amendment Immunity, 1974 DuKE L.J. 925.
11. See generally Comment, supra note 10.
12. 377 U.S. 184 (1964); see infra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
13. See id.; see also Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.'
829 (1970) (state operation of mental institution); Chesapeake Bay Bridge & Tunnel Dist. v.
Lauritzen, 404 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1968) (state operation of bridge).
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clear whether the state's use of copyrighted material constitutes
consent to suit in federal court. Thus, the question of whether the
implied waiver doctrine articulated in Parden applies in a copy14
right infringement suit against a state remains unanswered.
The second issue is the continued vitality of the eleventh
amendment in light of recent Supreme Court and lower federal
court decisions. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer1 5 the Supreme Court discarded, for the first time, the requirement of state immunity
waiver and held that in certain instances Congress has the power
to unilaterally abrogate eleventh amendment protection.16 While
Fitzpatrickconcerned a state's violation of a federal statute passed
pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, 7 later federal
court decisions have implied this broad congressional power in
other areas.' Two federal courts have extended the Fitzpatrick
holding beyond the context of fourteenth amendment legislation to
find that the copyright and patent clause empowers Congress to
nullify the eleventh amendment in copyright infringement cases.' 9
Under this interpretation, a private party could sue an allegedly
infringing state in federal court without the state's express or implied consent. If adopted by the Supreme Court, this broad read14. See infra notes 281-92 and accompanying text.
The federal government has expressly consented to federal court suit for copyright infringement. Money damages are the sole remedy for violations by the federal government;
injunctive relief is not available. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (1982); see S. REP. No. 1877, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. reprintedin 1960 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3444; H.R. REP. No. 624,

86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). See generally W. PATRY,
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270.71

(1986).
15. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
16. Id. at 456; see infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
17. Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 456. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment further provides: "The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5.
18. See, e.g., County of Monroe v. Florida, 678 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1104 (1983) (congressional extradition power); Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600
F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979) (congressional war powers); Jennings v. Illinois Office of Educ., 589
F.2d 935 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979) (congressional war powers); Oneida
Indian Nation v. New York, 520 F. Supp. 1278 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (congressional power to
regulate commerce with Indian tribes); see also infra notes 95-109 and accompanying text.
19. See Mills Music Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1285 (9th Cir. 1979); Johnson v.
University of Va., 606 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Va. 1985); infra notes 133-48, 162-78 and accompanying text.
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ing of Congress' power under the copyright and patent clause
would not only establish the amenability of nonconsenting states
to copyright infringement suits, but also would contract greatly the
boundaries of eleventh amendment immunity.2 0
Copyright proprietors have a great economic stake in the resolution of this issue. 2 State institutions and their local instrumentalities are prodigious users of copyrighted works.22 One obvious
example is the use of copyrighted textbooks by state schools and
universities. In addition, sound recordings, sheet music, textbooks,
plays, photographs, computer software, and motion pictures play
an integral role in the state's performance of its educational, health
care, recreational, and law enforcement functions.2 3 A textbook
publisher would have little economic incentive to continue producing books if the publisher knew that a state could misappropriate
the works by purchasing one copy for unlicensed reproduction.
One commentator has suggested that this situation would cause
purchases of copyrighted works to cease, resulting in a loss of revenue to creators.24
20. See Gibbons, supra note 4, at 2004. Without deciding the issue, the Supreme
Court recently noted this broadening interpretation by lower courts of Congress' power to
nullify a state's constitutional immunity from suit in federal court without the state's consent. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 252 (1985).
21. Goldberg, Copyright Law: Sovereign Immunity, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 20, 1985, at 1, col.
1; see, e.g., Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 778 (1962) (recognizing that the plaintiff "depends
upon the income from the [infringed] song for his support").
22. Goldberg, supra note 21, at 1, col. 1.
23. Id. In certain circumstances, such as teaching, scholarship, or research, a state
agency's use of portions of copyrighted works may be exempt from copyright restrictions
under the "fair use" limitation on a proprietor's exclusive rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982)
("Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use"). In determining whether a state's use of a copyrighted work is exempt, courts should consider four factors: (1) the purpose and character of
the use; (2) the nature of the work; (3) the substantiality of the portion used; and (4) the
effect of the use on the work's value. Id. § 107(1)-(4). For a general discussion of the fair use
doctrine, see Walker, Fair Use: The Adjustable Tool for MaintainingCopyright Equilibrium, 43 LA. L. REv. 735 (1983). See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-18 (1982) (listing limitations
on copyright owner's exclusive rights).
24. Goldberg, supra note 21, at 2, col. 4. As one party has argued:
States and state agencies, including schools, colleges, and libraries, make vast use of
copyrighted works. They buy countless textbooks, and works of science, biography, history, mathematics, fiction, poetry, philosophy, and other subjects. These state institutions also are a primary medium for the performance of copyrighted plays and musicals
.... Only the threat of damages awards, and injunctive relief, against States has prevented widespread infringement of them.
Motion on Appeal of the Authors League of Am., Inc. at 2-3, Mihalek Corp. v. Michigan, 595
F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Mich. 1984), appeal docketed, No. 85-1593 (6th Cir. July 23, 1985); see
also Motion on Appeal of the National Music Publishers' Ass'n, Inc. at 3, Mihalek, No. 851593 (urging that "[t]he potential injury . . . cannot be understated . . . . [S]tates could
supply thousands of photocopied reproductions of copyrighted music to members of univer-

230

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:225

A related concern is the form of relief available against an infringing state. While the Supreme Court in Ex parte Young 5 held
that a person could obtain injunctive relief against a state official
to prohibit future unconstitutional actions,26 the eleventh amendment generally protects a state from a damages award. In the
case of certain copyrighted works, such as popular songs that often
have only a brief period of economic productivity, injunctive relief
could come too late to vindicate completely the copyright proprietor's rights. 2s Thus, the issue of state immunity from copyright infringement suits not only has constitutional implications, but also
has immediate economic significance to copyright proprietors.
This Recent Development examines the federal court decisions
that concern alleged copyright infringement by a state or its instrumentalities. Part II discusses two areas of legal background: (1)
the history of eleventh amendment immunity as developed by the
Supreme Court; and (2) the federal court of appeals split on the
subject of state immunity from copyright infringement suits. Part
III examines five recent federal district court cases that analyze,
with differing results, copyright owners' attempts to sue states in
federal court for alleged infringement. Part IV discusses these infringement cases using the analytical frameworks employed by the
Supreme Court in Parden and Fitzpatrick. Finally, Part V proposes a resolution to the apparent conflict between copyright protection and the states' eleventh amendment immunity. This proposal accommodates several competing interests: copyright owners'
sity bands, orchestras and glee clubs, who could perform this music without payment of any
royalties to its composers and publishers and without fear of monetary sanction").
In addition, federal court immunity for states "could affect not only the rights of copyright owners, but also the rights of owners of other forms of intellectual property, including
patents and trademarks, which are widely used by State governmental bodies." Motion on
Appeal of the Intellectual Property Law Ass'n at 2, Mihalek, No. 85-1593.
25. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
26. Id. at 155-56; see infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668-71 (1974); see infra notes 74-79
and accompanying text.
28. Goldberg, supra note 21, at 2, col. 4. One party has argued:
[State immunity from federal court suit would relegate copyright owners] to the sole
remedy of prospective injunctive relief against individual state officials-if they can be
identified and sued before substantial damage is done. Totally unavailable as the deterrent intended by Congress to protect the value of copyrights would be the remedies
of recovery of the infringer's profits in addition to the owner's damages, the alternative
of statutory damages . . ., as well as recovery of costs and attorney's fees in appropriate cases. 17 U.S.C. §§ 504 and 505.
Motion on Appeal of National Music Publishers' Ass'n, Inc. at 6, Mihalek, No. 85-1593
(emphasis in original).
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interest in the protection of exclusive rights; states' interest in immunity from federal court suits; and society's interest in responsi2s
ble government.
II.

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

State Immunity Under the Eleventh Amendment
1. Early Developments

The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that a claimant
cannot sue the sovereign without the sovereign's consent.30 The
doctrine arose under the common law of England3 l and quickly
was adopted by the independent states of postrevolutionary
America.3 2 Thus, the states were immune from nonconsensual suits
in their own courts.3 3 Adoption of the United States Constitution,
however, created confusion about the states' immunity from suits
brought by private parties in the recently formed federal courts.34
Specifically, article III, section 2 of the Constitution provides that
"[t]he judicial Power shall extend . . .to Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another State."3 5 A literal reading of
this language presented the possibility that federal courts would
have jurisdiction over suits between a private party from one state
and another independent state.
Five years after ratification of the Constitution, the Supreme
Court faced this issue in Chisholm v. Georgia.3 6 In Chisholm two
South Carolina creditors sued the State of Georgia in federal court
for a Revolutionary War debt that the state allegedly owed. Interpreting article III literally, the Court held that the states were not
immune from private suits in federal court by citizens of another
29. See Note, supra note 10, at 537. For a discussion of foreign sovereign immunity in
the area of intellectual property, see generally Morris, Sovereign Immunity: The Exception
for Intellectual or IndustrialProperty, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 83 (1986).
30. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81
(A. Hamilton)); see also Note, supra note 4, at 151.
31. See generally Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental

Wrongs, 44 U. COLo. L. REV. 1, 2-5 (1972); see also Note, supra note 10, at 517-18 (discussing evolution of sovereign immunity in societal hierarchy of feudal England).

32. See, e.g., Employees v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 288
(1973) (Marshall, J., concurring); Note, supra note 10, at 518.
33. E.g., Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause:Damages Against
States in Their Own Courts for ConstitutionalViolations, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 189, 195 (1981).
34. See, e.g., Note, Deepening the Anomaly of Sovereign Immunity: Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 141, 146-47 (1984).
35. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cI. 1.
36. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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state."

' 38
The reaction of the states was "loud, angry, and unanimous.
Apparently fearing a flood of similar suits seeking repayment of
war debts,3 9 Congress and the states ratified the eleventh amendment in 1798.40 While the amendment essentially adopts the
states' common law sovereign immunity, 41 the scope of the amendment's immunity provision is limited to the federal courts.4 2
Over the next century and a half, the Supreme Court refined
its interpretation of the eleventh amendment. In Hans v. Louisiana43 the Court held that a state's constitutional immunity extends to federal court suits prosecuted by its own citizens." Later,
the Court restricted the amendment's purview in Ex parte
Young,4 5 a case in which the Court held that a state official acting
under color of state law could be sued in federal court for constitu-

37. Id. at 465-66.
38. Comment, supra note 10, at 926-27 n.6; see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662
(1974) (stating that "[t]he decision in [Chisholm] literally shocked the Nation. Sentiment
for passage of a constitutional amendment to override the decision rapidly gained
momentum").
39. Comment, supra note 10, at 926-27 n.6.
40. See, e.g., Employees, 411 U.S. at 280.
41. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI. Contra Employees, 411 U.S. at 290-94 (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that the eleventh amendment is merely an interpretation of article III); id.
at 315-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the eleventh amendment merely withdraws
a portion of diversity jurisdiction from the federal courts). For the text of the amendment,
see supra note 3.
42. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI; see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); Note,
supra note 10, at 515-16.
Despite the eleventh amendment's roots in common law sovereign immunity, the distinction between the two doctrines remains critical. While the eleventh amendment generally prohibits suits against states in federal court, the doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits states from being "sued in [their] own courts without [their] consent, regardless of
the nature of the claim." Wolcher, supra note 33, at 195; see also Note, supra note 10, at
519-20; Comment, supra note 10, at 947-49, 955. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at
416 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (declaring that "[ilt is inherent in the nature of
sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent") (emphasis
in original).
43. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
44. Id. at 21. In Hans the plaintiff argued that the eleventh amendment should be
read literally to allow suit in federal court against a state by its own citizens. The Court
called this "an attempt to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction never
imagined or dreamed of." Id. at 15.
45. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Young concerned state railroad rate and tariff restrictions
that were allegedly confiscatory and, therefore, in violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 127-29. In Young the plaintiff sought injunctive relief against
the Attorney General of Minnesota to prevent the enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. Id.
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tional violations. 4" Despite these modifications, the law remained
clear that a state was not amenable to private suit in federal court
unless it expressly consented. For example, in Murray v. Wilson
Distilling Co. 47 the Court held that only express language or an
overwhelming implication from the wording of a state statute or
constitution would suffice to show a waiver of immunity.48
2. Parden v. Terminal Railway and Progeny-Implied Waiver
of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Parden v. Terminal Railway49 represents an important departure from the Supreme Court's historical analysis of eleventh
amendment immunity. For the first time, the Court found a waiver
of constitutional immunity implied by a state's actions under a
federal statute. 50 In Parden employees of a state owned railroad
sued the State of Alabama in federal court under the Federal Employees' Liability Act (FELA).1 The FELA specifically created a
cause of action against employers for damages suffered from jobrelated personal injuries. The railroad employees claimed that the
state was liable because, under the FELA, the railroad was a common carrier engaging in interstate commerce and, thus, was amenable to suit in federal court. The state moved to dismiss, arguing
that the railway was a state agency 52 and that the state had not
46. Id. at 159-60. The Court adopted the legal fiction that a state official who acts
pursuant to an unconstitutional state statute is "stripped of his official or representative
character" and, thus, is not protected by the eleventh amendment. Id. at 159-60; see also
Kentucky v. Graham, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3107 n.18 (1985) (holding that "[iln an injunctive or
declaratory action grounded on federal law, the State's immunity can be overcome by naming state officials as defendants") (emphasis in original); Papasan v. Allain, 106 S. Ct. 2932,

2940 n.11 (1986) (holding that "[w]hen a state official is sued and held liable in his individual capacity ... even damages may be awarded") (emphasis in original) (citing Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974)).
47.

213 U.S. 151 (1909).

48. Id. at 171. "A federal court may also rely on the decisional law of a state" or a
state's "voluntary appearance in a proceeding already properly instituted" to demonstrate
an express waiver of eleventh amendment immunity. Comment, supra note 10, at 929 n.17
(quoting Interstate Constr. Co. v. Regents of the Univ. of Idaho, 199 F. 509 (D. Idaho 1912)

(decisional law) and Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906) (voluntary
appearance)).
49. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
50. Id. at 192-93.
51. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
52. Parden, 377 U.S. at 185. The railway consisted "of about 50 miles of railroad
tracks in the area adjacent to the State Docks at Mobile . . . . It perform[ed] services for
profit under statutory authority . . . . It conduct[ed] substantial operations in interstate

commerce." Id.
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waived its sovereign immunity.53
As part of its three-step analysis, the Court first discussed
whether Congress, by creating a cause of action under the FELA,
intended to subject the states to suit. 54 Reading the. language of
the statute literally, the Court determined that the phrase "every
55
common carrier by railroad engaged in [interstate] commerce"
was broad enough to include state owned railroads as potential defendants. The Court reasoned that absent express language to the
contrary, a statutory exception for sovereign immunity should not
be presumed.5" This exception, the Court concluded, would lead to
the "pointless and frustrating result" of giving state employees a
right without a remedy. 5 Thus, the Court concluded that Congress, by enacting the FELA, intended to subject the states to suits
in federal court.
Next, the Court considered whether Congress had the power
to subject a state to federal suit notwithstanding the eleventh
amendment. 58 The Court determined that in granting Congress the
power to regulate interstate commerce, the states had surrendered
any part of their sovereign immunity that would impede that regulation. 58 Thus, in exercising its commerce power Congress could
override the states' sovereign immunity and render the states amenable to suit under the FELA.e°
Finally, the Court held that in view of this abrogation of sovereign immunity,61 the state's subsequent operation of the railroad
in interstate commerce implied that Alabama had consented to
53. Id.
54. Id. at 187. The Court stated that "[h]ere, for the first time in this Court, a State's
claim of immunity against suit by an individual meets a suit brought upon a cause of action
expressly created by Congress." Id.
55. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982). The FELA provides that "[e]very common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States . . . shall be liable in
damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce." Id. The statute further provides that "[u]nder this Chapter an action may be
brought in a district court of the United States . . . ." Id. § 56.
56. Parden, 377 U.S. at 190. The Court also looked to the legislative history of the
FELA, which stated that the statute was "intended... to cover all commerce to which the
regulative power of Congress extends." Id. at 187-88 n.5 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1386, 60th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1908)).
57. Parden, 377 U.S. at 190. "It would be. . . surprising to learn that the FELA does
make the [railway] 'liable' to petitioners, but, unfortunately, provides no means by which
that liability may be enforced." Id. at 197.
58. Id. at 190.
59. Id.; see Comment, supra note 10, at 929-30.
60. Parden, 377 U.S. at 191-92.
61. Id. at 192.
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suit in federal court under the FELA.12 Congress, the Court declared, conditioned the state's right to operate the railroad upon
subjection to the commerce power and consent to suits in federal
court.63 The Court concluded that "when a State leaves the sphere
that is exclusively its own and enters into activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that regulation as fully as
if it were a private person or corporation. ' 64 While the state argued
that its constitution and decisional law did not evidence consent to
suit in this case, the Court held that the implied waiver issue was a
question of federal, not state, law.6 5 Accordingly, the Court held
that Congress could condition entry into a federally regulated activity upon a state's amenability to suit in federal court.
Later Supreme Court cases have limited the Parden implied
waiver doctrine. In Employees v. Department of Public Health
and Welfare66 state health facility employees sued the State of
Missouri for overtime pay and damages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)6 Although the Court concluded
that the class of potential defendants, defined in the FLSA as "any
employer,"6 8 includes states and their agencies,6 9 the Court found
no congressional intent to subject states to suit in federal court.70
The Court reasoned that the FLSA authorized suit only in courts
62. Id. The Court stated, "Alabama, when it began operation of an interstate railroad
approximately 20 years after enactment of the FELA, necessarily consented to such suit as
was authorized by that Act." Id.
63. Id. The State of Alabama argued that because Congress could not directly remove
the states' sovereign immunity, it would be unconstitutional for Congress to impose a condition of amenability to federal suit on the states' entry into interstate commerce. Id. at 193
n.11. The Court, however, distinguished Parden from the cases cited by the State of Alabama in its "unconstitutional condition" argument, noting that, unlike those cases, Parden
involved a legitimate exercise of legislative power. Id.
64. Id. at 196. While not expressly mentioning the distinction between "proprietary"
and "governmental" activities of the state, the Court, in dictum, noted that "[s]tates have
entered ... numerous forms of activity which, if carried on by a private person or corporation, would be subject to federal regulation." Id. at 196-97. The governmental-proprietary
distinction implied by this language has since been abandoned by the Court. See Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537-47 (1985) (overruling National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
65. Parden, 377 U.S. at 196.
66. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
67. 52 Stat. 1069 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982)).
68. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
69. Employees, 411 U.S. at 282-83. Although the FLSA originally had defined "employer" to exclude the states and their political subdivisions, Congress in 1966 expanded the
statute to cover "employees of a State, or a political subdivision thereof, employed. . . in a
hospital [or] institution." Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, §
102(b), 80 Stat. 830, 831 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1982)).
70. Employees, 411 U.S. at 285.
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of competent jurisdiction; the eleventh amendment, however, rendered federal courts incompetent to deliver a judgment against
nonconsenting states."' Thus, while reaffirming its Pardendecision,
which held that Congress has the power to subject arguably nonconsenting states to suit in federal court, the Employees Court distinguished Parden, indicating that the "exercise of such power
would not be presumed without clear evidence" of congressional
intent.7 2 Absent clear congressional intent, federal suit by the private parties in Employees was barred."3
The Supreme Court continued to limit the doctrine of implied
waiver of eleventh amendment immunity in Edelman v. Jordan.4
In Edelman Illinois state officials allegedly withheld benefits under
Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled (AABD),7 5 a public aid program authorized under the Social Security Act and funded by the
state and federal governments. The Edelman Court first noted
that, unlike the statutes in Pardenand Employees, the AABD had
not created a private cause of action for aggrieved beneficiaries.
Absent a statutory cause of action evidencing congressional intent,
the Court held that the doctrine of implied waiver would not be
available against a state. Furthermore, the Court held that a
waiver of eleventh amendment immunity would be found only
when astate indicated consent to a suit in federal court "'by the
most express language or by such overwhelming implications...
as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.' ,76
Reasoning that a state's mere operation of a federally assisted aid
program was not a "clear declaration" of consent to federal court
suit,77 the Court concluded that Congress had not intended to ab71.

Id. at 283-84; see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).

72. L. TRIBE,

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 3-36, at 135 (1978). The Court addi-

tionally noted that the FLSA allowed successful plaintiffs double recovery, Employees, 411
U.S. at 286, and stated that "we are reluctant to believe that Congress in pursuit of a harmonious federalism desired to treat the States so harshly," Id.
73. The Court's holding, however, did not leave the employees a right without a remedy. The Court noted that the FLSA authorized the Secretary of Labor to sue, on behalf of
employees, states violating the statute. Employees, 411 U.S. at 285-86. In addition, the
Court suggested that "[a]rguably, [the FLSA] permits suit in the [state] courts." Id. at 287.
74. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-83 (1982 & Supp. I 1983). While the plaintiff-applicants sought
only declaratory and injunctive relief, the federal district court, in addition to granting their
request, ordered the State of Illinois to" 'release and remit AABD benefits wrongfully withheld to all applicants." Edelman, 415 U.S. at 656.
76. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673 (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151,
171 (1909)). The Edelman Court used the term "constructive," instead of implied, consent.
77. Id. The Court noted that "the mere fact that a State participates in a program
through which the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by the State of
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rogate the state's constitutional immunity. 78 Under Edelman,
therefore, without an express federal cause of action, a state will
not be found to have impliedly waived its eleventh amendment immunity. The Court, however, held that while the eleventh amendment prohibits "retroactive" monetary relief against state officials,
as ordered by the federal district court, the amendment does not
preclude "prospective" relief in the form of an injunction against
state officials to bar future unconstitutional conduct.7 9
3.

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Later Cases-Congressional
Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Twelve years after Parden the Supreme Court again substantially reduced the states' eleventh amendment protection. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 0 the Court ruled for the first time that state
waiver is not always required to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity. In Fitzpatrick Connecticut state employees sued the state
in federal court, claiming sexual discrimination in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),81 which authorizes
the award of damages and attorney's fees to private parties.8 2 Because Title VII specifies governments, governmental agencies, and
a system of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to be
sued in the federal courts." Id.
78. Id. at 672-74.
79. Id. at 664-71. Thus, the Court limited the Young doctrine to private suits seeking
injunctive, but not monetary, relief against state officials. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. The Court reasoned that restitution would not come from the defendant-officials, but rather from state funds-a result prohibited by the eleventh amendment. Id. at
677 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945)). The eleventh
amendment generally continues to bar suit against a state or its agencies regardless of the
type of relief sought. See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam). The
Edelman Court, in dictum, stated that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), which authorizes suit
against state officials for deprivation of civil rights, does not evince a congressional intent to
abrogate a state's eleventh amendment immunity. Thus, under this reading even in a suit
brought under § 1983, the claimant cannot seek retroactive relief against a state official if
damages would be paid from public funds. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 674-77; see also Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 (1979); cf. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978) (holding that the class of potential § 1983 defendants includes municipalities); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 781-82 (1978) (per curiam). But see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.
at 678, 703 (1978) (Brennan, J. concurring) (stating that it is "surely at least an open question whether § 1983 . . .does not make the States liable for relief of all kinds, notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment").
80. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
81. 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 20000e-17 (1982)). Title
VII provides that employers are liable for damages to employees subjected to discriminatory
hiring practices based on race, color, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), (k) (1982).
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political subdivisions as possible defendants,8 3 the Court found
that Congress clearly intended to authorize federal courts to award
damages in private suits against the states. s4 Significantly, the
Court did not examine whether the state had waived its eleventh
amendment immunity.8 5 Noting that Congress had passed Title
VII under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, the Court
stated:
When Congress acts pursuant to § 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] it is
exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment
whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority. We think that Congress may, in determining what is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or State officials which are
6
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.

Thus, the Court effectively held that Congress could, if it clearly so
intended, unilaterally nullify eleventh amendment immunity without a state's consent, express or implied. 7 While condoning the effective nullification of a constitutional amendment's protection by
congressional compulsion, the Court restricted the application of
its holding to legislation passed pursuant to the "limited authority" of the fourteenth amendment. 8
In Hutto v. Finney,"9 which concerned a different statute
passed under Congress' fourteenth amendment power, the Supreme Court reaffirmed and expanded its Fitzpatrick holding. In
Hutto Arkansas prison inmates brought an action against state officials to correct unconstitutional conditions in the Arkansas prison
system. A federal circuit court of appeals, in affirming the district
court's remedial orders, assessed attorney's fees under the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (Attorney's Fees Act) 90
to cover the cost of services on appeal. The Supreme Court held
that a plaintiff could recover attorney's fees in a civil rights case
against the state even though the Attorney's Fees Act did not ex83. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103, amended Title VII
to include states and their governmental subdivisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
84. Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 448-49.
85. Note, supra note 10, at 524.
86. Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 456.
87. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3145 (1985).
88. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-48
(1880)).
89. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
90. Id. at 685; see 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). The Attorney's Fees Act "declares that in
suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and certain other statutes, federal courts may award prevailing
parties reasonable attorney's fees 'as part of the costs.'" Hutto, 437 U.S. at 693.
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pressly include states in the defendant class.91 The Court found
that the legislative history of the statute clearly indicated Congress' intention to subject the states to suit under the Attorney's
Fees Act.2 In addition, the Court noted that the Attorney's Fees
Act allowed the award of attorney's fees as "costs," which are not
subject to eleventh amendment immunity. The Hutto court,
therefore, extended Fitzpatrick by finding clear evidence of congressional intent, not in the statute's language but in its legislative
history, to nullify eleventh amendment immunity.94
Significantly, lower federal courts 5 have cited Fitzpatrick in
various nonfourteenth amendment cases to find clear congressional
intent to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity.9 6 For example,
in Peel v. Florida Department of Transportation97 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Congress,
acting under its article I war power, 98 statutorily could nullify elev91. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 696-97.
92. Id. at 700; see S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976) (stating that "it is
intended that attorney's fees . . . will be collected either . . . from funds of [the official's]
agency. . . or from the state or local government"); H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
7 (1976).
Citing Fitzpatrick, the Court reaffirmed that "Congress has plenary power to set aside
the States' immunity from retroactive relief in order to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
When it passed the [Attorney's Fees] Act, Congress undoubtedly intended. . . to authorize
fee awards payable by the States when their officials are sued in their official capacities."
Hutto, 437 U.S. at 693-94.
93. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 695.
94. However, the Court's willingness to find congressional intent to abrogate a state's
constitutional immunity in a statute's legislative history may be limited to the facts of
Hutto. In Atascadero the Court reiterated that the "statutory language" in question must
express an "unmistakable intent" to support a finding of abrogation of eleventh amendment
immunity pursuant to Congress' fourteenth amendment power. Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at
3142, 3148; see infra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 520 F. Supp. 1278, 1308 (N.D.N.Y.
1981) (holding that "consent of the State is not required when Congress acts pursuant to its
Article I powers").
97. 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979).
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides, in part:
The Congress shall have Power To . . . provide for the common Defense and general
Welfare of the United States; ...
To declare War, .
To raise and support Armies, .
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing
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enth amendment protection without the state's consent." The
court reasoned that, in theory, a state consents to private suit in
federal court whenever Congress sufficiently shows an intent to
nullify immunity. 0 0 The court concluded that "[t]his rationale
removes the eleventh amendment as a bar whenever Congress validly has exercised its powers."' 1 1 Thus, the court affirmed the district court order reinstating the employee and compensating him
for lost wages and benefits. 02
The dramatic expansion of the Supreme Court's Fitzpatrick
holding' 0 has been characterized by the Peel court as the "sub
silentio merging of the separate state consent requirement into the
single inquiry of whether Congress has statutorily waived the
state's immunity."' 0 4 In County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation "05 the Supreme Court noted that the only argument offered to
enforce the state's amenability to federal suit was that "the States
necessarily consented to suit in federal court with respect to enactments under [the Commerce] Clause."' 0 6 Thus, the counties argued
that the state waived its immunity to suit in federal court merely
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, .
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers ....
U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8.

99. In Peel a Florida state employee, discharged because he was absent from work
during National Guard training, sued the agency for which he had worked, seeking reemployment and lost wages and benefits. The plaintiff sued under the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-26 (1982), which was passed pursuant to the war powers
of Congress and which authorized federal court suits to enforce reemployment rights. Peel,
600 F.2d at 1072-73.
100. Peel, 600 F.2d at 1080. "[N]othing in the history of the eleventh amendment.
indicates that Congress, when acting under an article I, section 8 delegated power, lacks the
authority to provide for federal court enforcement of private damage actions against the
states." Id.
101. Id. The court stated that under this rationale the eleventh amendment remains
effective merely as a "check on the judicial power to imply private damage remedies against
the states" when congressional intent is not evidenced sufficiently. Id. at 1081.
102. Id. at 1073.
103. See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (citing
County of Monroe v. Florida, 678 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104
(1983) and Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979)).
104. Peel, 600 F.2d at 1080.
105. County of Oneida, 470 U.S. 226 (1985). In County of Oneida Indian tribes sued
New York counties under the Nonintercourse Act of 1793 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 177 (1982)), which provided that no person or entity could buy Indian land without approval by the federal government. The counties, held liable for damages in connection with
illegal land purchases, were granted indemnification from the State of New York by the
federal district court. County of Oneida, 105 S.Ct. at 1249.
106. County of Oneida, 105 S.Ct. at 252.
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by violating a statute passed pursuant to the commerce power of
Congress. 10 7 Although in Fitzpatrick the Court limited its holding
to fourteenth amendment enactments, 0 8 in County of Oneida the
Court chose not to decide whether the lower courts' expanded
readings had gone too far.109
The Supreme Court, however, recently clarified its position on
eleventh amendment immunity in Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon."0 In Atascadero the disabled respondent,"' seeking damages for alleged employment discrimination, sued a state hospital
in federal court under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.112 The Court
held that the eleventh amendment barred recovery from the
state " even though the statute, passed pursuant to section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment, provided for remedies against "any recipient of Federal assistance,"11 4 a class that arguably includes the
state.1 5 The Court ruled that a "general authorization for suit in
federal court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment." 1 6 The Court noted
that Congress must specifically include the states within the defendant class when intending to subject the states to suit in federal
court." 7 The Court also held that the state's mere participation in
a federally funded program under the statute did not demonstrate
implicit consent to federal jurisdiction. Instead, the Court required
"an unequivocal indication" that the state consented to federal
jurisdiction." 8
107. Id.
108. See supra text accompanying note 86.
109. "[The counties] contend [that] Congress can abrogate the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity and has done so by enacting the Nonintercourse Acts .... Assuming without deciding that this reasoning is correct, it does not address the Eleventh Amendment problem here." County of Oneida, 470 U.S. at 252.
110. 105 S.Ct. 3142 (1985).
111. Respondent also sought injunctive and declaratory relief. Atascadero, 105 S. Ct.
at 3144.
112. 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982)). The Rehabilitation Act provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual ... shall, solely
by reason of his handicap,. . . be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
113. Atascadero, 105 S.Ct. at 3150.
114. Id. at 3149 (emphasis added by Court) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1982)).
115. Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3149.
116. Id. at 3149. In support of this ruling, the Court noted that "given their constitutional role, the States are not like any other class of recipients of federal aid." Id.
117. Id. The Court stated that congressional intent to abrogate eleventh amendment
immunity pursuant to § 5 of the fourteenth amendment must be "unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute." Id. at 3147.
118. Id. at 3145 n.1 (emphasis added). "The court [of appeals] erred ...in concluding
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In Atascadero the Supreme Court restricted its Fitzpatrick
holding 1 9 in two important ways. First, the Court reiterated that
Fitzpatrick held that Congress' augmented power to unilaterally
abrogate eleventh amendment immunity without the states' consent was limited to statutes passed pursuant to section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment. 12 0 Second, the Court held that a congressional intent to limit eleventh amendment protection was not evident when Congress generally authorized federal suit against "any
recipient of Federal assistance"' 121 instead of specifically including
states as potential defendants. Thus, absent clear congressional intent, a state's constitutional immunity cannot be abrogated. These
statements are the Supreme Court's most current stance on the
doctrine of implied waiver of eleventh amendment immunity.
B.

Copyright Protection and the Eleventh AmendmentThe Circuit Court Split

The circuit court split over the proper relationship between
copyright protection and the eleventh amendment developed because of different interpretations of the 1909 Copyright Act (the
1909 Act).2 2 Pursuant to the copyright and patent clause, section 1
of the 1909 Act grants copyright proprietors the "exclusive right,"
among other things, to "print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the
copyrighted work" and to "perform the copyrighted work publicly
for profit if it be a musical composition.' 23 The 1909 Act further
provides that "any person" who infringes the copyright in "any
work" is subject to injunction and liable for damages, illegally
that. . . a State necessarily consents to suit in federal court by participating in programs
funded under the [Rehabilitation Act]." Id. at 3150.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan stated that the purpose of the eleventh amendment is to
preserve the states' immunity from federal court jurisdiction only in diversity suits and not
to bar suits based on a federal question. Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3177 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissent included an extensive historical review of eleventh
amendment jurisprudence. See id. at 3150-78. This narrow reading of the eleventh amendment, which would allow copyright suits against states in federal court, has not been accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court.
119. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
120. Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3145.
121. Id. at 3149. Significantly, the Atascadero Court changed the focus of its inquiry
from a determination of whether the statutory defendant class was broad enough to include
states, see, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 187-90 (1964); see also supra notes
49-65 and accompanying text, to a determination of whether the state had been included
specifically in the defendant class.
122. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976); see supra note 6.
123. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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earned profits, court costs, and attorney's fees.
1.

24

Wihtol v. Crow

125

In Wihtol v. Crow the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit became the first circuit court to consider
whether a state instrumentality could be subjected to federal jurisdiction for alleged copyright infringement. The appellant, a composer who alleged that the choral director of an Iowa junior college
and high school copied and rearranged his copyrighted song without permission, sued the director and his employer, the local school
district. 12 6 On appeal from the district court's dismissal of the complaint, 127 the school district argued that it could not be held liable
28
for the actions of an agent acting in a governmental capacity.1
The Eighth Circuit held that the eleventh amendment's bar to
federal court suits against the states deprived the district court of
jurisdiction to hear the case against the school district. 29 The
court reasoned that the school district, as part of the state's educational system, was a state instrumentality engaged in performing a
state governmental function under state law and at state expense.130 Because any potential damage judgment would be payable out of state funds, the federal court could not exercise jurisdiction without the state's consent.' 3 ' Thus, while the court found
that the choir director infringed the composer's rights in the song,
the court held that the school district was entitled to dismissal of
the action for lack of jurisdiction. 13 2
124. Id. §§ 101, 116.
125. 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962).
126. The unauthorized arrangement of the song was performed once by the school
choir. Id. at 778-79.
127. See Wihtol v. Crow, 199 F. Supp. 682 (1961). The federal district court held that
the choir director's use of the song was a noninfringing "fair use." Wihtol, 309 F.2d at 780.
See generally supra note 23. The district court, however, further held that regardless of
whether the use was "fair," the school district could not be held liable for copyright infringement. Wihtol, 309 F.2d at 780.
128. Wihtol, 309 F.2d at 778-79.
129. Id. at 781-82. "Whether the School District can be subjected to liability for the
copyright infringement. . . is a debatable question. A suit against the State of Iowa, for the
infringement of a copyright, clearly could not be maintained, because of the Eleventh
Amendment. . . ." Id. at 781.
130. Id. at 782. But see infra note 207.
131. See Wihtol, 309 F.2d at 781-82.
132. In addition, a church at which the choir director also worked and whose choir
performed the unauthorized song was found liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. at 783.
Because the Wihtol opinion was rendered prior to Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184
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2. Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona
Seventeen years after the Wihtol decision the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reconsidered the issue of
eleventh amendment immunity in copyright suits. In Mills Music,
Inc. v. Arizona"'3 a music publisher sued the State of Arizona in
federal court for the willful infringement of a copyrighted musical
composition, which the state allegedly used as the theme song for a
state fair promotion.13 4 Appealing from the district court's judgment for the publisher, the state argued that the eleventh amendment did not allow the award of damages or attorney's fees. 135 The
publisher, however, claimed that the state waived its eleventh
amendment immunity through its voluntary participation in a federally regulated activity and through "constitutional subordination
of sovereignty."13 6
13 7
The Ninth Circuit, citing Parden v. Terminal Railway, Employees v. Department of Public Health and Welfare,138 and
Edelman v. Jordan,39 enunciated a test for determining whether a
state had consented to suit. The court found that a state waives its
eleventh amendment immunity "when Congress has authorized
suit against a class of defendants that includes states, and the state
enters into the activity regulated by federal law.' 40 The court first
determined that Congress had intended that the states be amenable to suit in the federal courts for copyright infringement. Noting
that the 1909 Act defined the class of potential defendants as "any
person" who infringes a copyright, the court reasoned that this
broad language, "sweeping and without apparent limitation, suggest[s] that Congress intended to include states."'' Second, the
(1964), the decision did not discuss the issue of the school district's possible implied consent
and did not consider the availability of injunctive relief.
133. 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979).
134. The plaintiff, who sued the State of Arizona and the Arizona Coliseum and Exposition Center Board, a state agency, also alleged unfair competition. Id. at 1280-81.
135. Id. at 1280. The district court found that the defendants made 64 tapes and
broadcast 3,928 radio and television performances of an unauthorized arrangement of the
composition. The district court rejected the defendants' argument that, under § l(e) of the
1909 Act, their use was not for profit and, thus, did not constitute infringement. Id. at 1281.
136. Id. at 1283. The court initially determined that the defendants had not consented
to federal court suit merely because they admitted the district court's jurisdiction and failed
to interpose their eleventh amendment defense until after trial. Id. at 1282.
137. 377 U.S. 184 (1964); see supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
138. 411 U.S. 279 (1973); see supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
139. 415 U.S. 651 (1974); see supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
140. Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1283.
141. Id. at 1284-85. The court noted that "[elven the United States is liable for the
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court held that the state voluntarily engaged in the federally regulated commercial activity of copyright use, 142 thus fulfilling the second requirement for waiver of eleventh amendment sovereign
immunity.
The court next explored the issue of whether the eleventh
amendment was subordinate constitutionally to the copyright and
patent clause. Citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,143 the court held that
the copyright and patent clause empowered Congress to subject infringing states to suits in federal court despite the eleventh amendment.14 4 The court decided that the abrogation of a state's eleventh amendment immunity clearly is inherent in the copyright and
patent clause and the 1909 Act.146 The court reasoned that when
"Congress grants an exclusive right or monopoly, its effects are
pervasive; no citizen or State may escape its reach.'1 46 Finding
the state amenable to suit in federal court, the Mills Music court
affirmed the district court's award of damages and attorney's fees.
The court acknowledged that its decision was contrary to the
Eighth Circuit's holding in Wihtol,147 but nevertheless concluded
that a "state may not, consistent with the Constitution, infringe
the federally protected rights of the copyright holder, and thereafter avoid the federal system of statutory protections. "148
infringement of a copyright . . .; to hold that Congress did not intend to include states
within the class of defendants would lead to an anomalous construction of the statute at
best." The court reasoned further that "the Copyright and Patent Clause is a specific grant
of constitutional power that contains inherent limitations on state sovereignty." Id. at 1285.
142.

Id. at 1286.

143.

427 U.S. 445 (1976); see supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.

144.

Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1283, 1285-86.

145.

Id. at 1285.

146. Id. (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973) (emphasis added)).
Significantly, Goldstein, on which the court's subordination analysis relied heavily, did not
concern copyright infringement but, instead, concerned federal preemption in the copyright
field. In Goldstein the Supreme Court upheld a state criminal statute despite a preemption
objection.
147.

Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1286.

148. Id. The court noted: "[T]he Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity does not
permit a state to nullify [copyrights]." Id.
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed a federal district court's finding of eleventh amendment immunity from a copyright
infringement suit. See Cardinal Indus., Inc. v. Anderson Parrish Assocs., Inc., No. 83-1038Civ.-T-13, slip op. (M.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 1985), aff'd, No. 86-3354 (11th Cir. Jan. 27, 1987) (per
curiam); infra notes 196-205 and accompanying text.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Following Mills Music the conflict in the federal courts between the protection of copyright proprietors and the states' constitutional immunity did not reemerge for five years.14 Recently,
however, a federal circuit court of appeals and five federal district
courts have rekindled the controversy with decisions on both sides
.of the issue.
A.

Mihalek Corp. v. Michigan

50
the plaintiff sued the state
In Mihalek Corp. v. Michigan1
for copyright infringement under the 1909 Act, seeking damages
and injunctive relief.' 5' The plaintiff claimed that the state's
agents misappropriated his copyrighted materials and used them
for a promotional campaign to encourage travel and investment in
Michigan.' 52 The state claimed immunity under the eleventh

149. A similar split has developed between federal district courts concerning patent
infringement by the states. Compare Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar an award of money damages
against a state agency in federal court for patent infringement) with Hercules, Inc. v. Minnesota State Highway Dep't, 337 F. Supp. 795 (D. Minn. 1972) (holding that a state agency,
although subject to injunction, is immune, under the eleventh amendment, from federal
court suit seeking money damages for patent infringement).
In Association of Am. Medical Colleges v. Carey, 482 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D.N.Y. 1980),
the court, citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), held that the eleventh amendment
did not bar a preliminary injunction against copyright infringement by state officials. See
supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. Following Mills Music at least three state attorneys general opined that states can be held liable for copyright infringement. See W. PATRY,
supra note 14, at 272 n.70.
150. 595 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Mich. 1984), appeal docketed, No. 85-1593 (6th Cir. July
23, 1985).
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit faced the issue of
copyright infringement by state officials almost ninety years ago in Howell v. Miller, 91 F.
129 (6th Cir. 1898). Although the court refused on other grounds to grant an injunction, it
ruled that the eleventh amendment does not bar a federal court suit seeking injunctive relief
to prevent infringement by officers and agents of a state. The Howell plaintiff did not seek
money damages.
151. The defendants were the State of Michigan, the Michigan Department of Commerce and its director, and the governor. In addition to copyright infringement, the plaintiff
also brought pendant state claims for unfair competition and misappropriation of work
product, as well as claims for violation of trademark and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (allowing
private damages suit for civil rights deprivations "under color of law"). Mihalek, 595 F.
Supp. at 904. In Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979), the Supreme Court held that 42
U.S.C. § 1983 does not abrogate eleventh amendment immunity.
152. "Plaintiff alleges that he entered into agreements with agents of the state of
Michigan for creation of [the promotional campaign]. He showed the materials to these people while the work was in progress, and the agents allegedly appropriated the designs for
their own use ...." Mihalek, 595 F. Supp. at 904.
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Noting the earlier circuit court split, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan rejected the Mills
Music1 5 4 rationale, which concluded that the 1909 Act had abrogated the states' eleventh amendment immunity, and held that the
state was immune from suit in federal court. 155 Relying on
Edelman v. Jordan, 56 the court first noted that although the copyright and patent clause exhibits a clear federal interest in the area
of copyright, the 1909 Act, not the copyright and patent clause,
afforded specific protection against infringement. 157 The court concluded that a right against infringement, although guaranteed by
federal law, "is deserving of no more protection than is the right to
benefits for the aged, blind, and disabled," for which the Supreme
Court denied "retroactive" monetary relief in Edelman.15'
The Mihalek court held that despite federal statutory copyright protection, the eleventh amendment bars federal jurisdiction
to award damages that would be paid out of state funds. 59 Thus,
the defendants were immune from the plaintiff's request for monetary damages. Although the state was totally immune from suit,
the court acknowledged that under Ex parte Young160 the plaintiff
could seek an injunction against future infringement by state
16 1
agents.
B.

Johnson v. University of Virginia

Johnson v. University of Virginia"2 was the first eleventh
amendment case decided under the revised Copyright Act of 1976
153. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that although individual state officials
were named in the suit, the action was against the state. Id. at 904-05. In addition, the
defendants moved for a change of venue, which the court denied. Id. at 906-07.
154. See supra notes 133-48 and accompanying text. The plaintiffs responded to the
defendants' motion to dismiss by arguing that, under Mills Music, the eleventh amendment
did not bar federal copyright suits against states or state officials. Mihalek, 595 F. Supp. at
905.
155. Mihalek, 595 F. Supp. at 905-06.
156. 415 U.S. 651 (1974); see supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
157. Mihalek, 595 F. Supp. at 906.
158. Id.; see Edelman, 415 U.S. at 669.
159. Mihalek, 595 F. Supp. at 906. Citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), the court ruled that the eleventh amendment also bars injunctive
relief against state officials in federal court for claims based on state law. Mihalek, 595 F.
Supp. at 906.
160. 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
161. Mihalek, 595 F. Supp. at 906.
162. 606 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Va. 1985).
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(the 1976 Act).' 6" The 1976 Act provides that "anyone who violates
any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright;"' 64 liable for damages, profits, costs, and
attorney's fees; and subject to injunction., Under the 1976 Act,
the copyright proprietor has the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, perform, display publicly, and prepare derivations of the
protected work. 6 ' One important purpose for this revision of the
1909 Act was to allow Congress to exercise more fully its powers
under the copyright and patent clause. 16 Thus, for example, the
1976 Act expressly preempts state law copyright protection for federally protected subject matter 6 8 and extends protection to all
"original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression."''6 9
In Johnson the plaintiff alleged that the state university and
two employees infringed his copyright in photographs taken at the
school's sporting events. The plaintiff sought statutory damages
and attorney's fees. The defendants, however, argued that the eleventh amendment barred any claim payable out of the state's treasury. 70 Citing Mills Music,'7 ' the United States District for the
Western District of Virginia held that the 1909 and 1976 Acts abrogated the state's constitutional immunity under the eleventh
72
amendment.
The court reasoned that under the Mills Music court's reading
of Edelman7 3 a federal statute effectively could nullify a state's
eleventh amendment protection if Congress' intent was explicit or
163. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
164. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
165. Id. §§ 502, 504, 505.
166. Id. § 106.
167. See id. § 301 (1982).
168. Id. § 301 (a).
169. Id. § 102(a); see 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1976) (stating that "[tihe works for which copyright may be secured under this title shall include all the writings of an author") (emphasis
added).
170. Johnson, 606 F. Supp. at 322. The plaintiff also brought a pendant state claim for
the alleged loss of photographic slides. The defendants moved for dismissal or summary
judgment, arguing that the infringement claim against the university, and its employees
derivatively, actually was against the Commonwealth of Virginia. In addition to this eleventh amendment argument, the defendants also alleged that the plaintiff had "not made the
requisite showing for . . . damages and fees." Id. at 322.
171. 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979); see supra notes 133-48 and accompanying text.
172. Johnson, 606 F. Supp. at 324.
173. 415 U.S. 651 (1974); see supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
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overwhelmingly apparent. 174 The court first noted Mills Music's
holding that the class of potential defendants, defined in the 1909
Act as "any person [who infringes]," was broad enough to evidence
an intent to include the states.' 7 5 Turning next to the language of
the 1976 Act, the court found that the defendant class, defined as
"anyone [who infringes], ' 17 6 was "at least as sweeping, and probably more sweeping" than that of the 1909 Act. 177 Based on the
Mills Music rationale and the revised statutory text, the court concluded that the 1976 Act nullified the state's eleventh amendment
protection against money damages and injunctive relief. 17 8 Accordingly, the Johnson court denied the defendants' motion for dismissal or summary judgment. Having found sufficient congressional
intent in the 1976 Act to abrogate the state's eleventh amendment
immunity, the court did not consider whether the state had consented to suit in federal court.
C. Woelffer v. Happy States of America, Inc.
7
In Woelffer v. Happy States of America, Inc.'1
an Illinois
80
state agency'
sought a judicial declaration that the eleventh
amendment barred the defendant's potential copyright claim concerning the state's use of a slogan in a tourism campaign.' 8 ' The
defendant counterclaimed, alleging copyright infringement and

174. Johnson, 606 F. Supp. at 323-24. "Wihtol provides little more than a conclusory
statement that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the states, their instrumentalities, and their agents. . . .By contrast, Mills Music includes a thoughtful examination of
the 1909 Act and the recent Supreme Court opinions concerning the Eleventh Amendment
.... " Id. at 323.
175. Id. at 323 (citing Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1285); see 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
176. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
177. Johnson, 606 F. Supp. at 324.
178. Id. The court, however, granted the defendants' motion requesting dismissal of
the pendant state law claim for the lost photographic slides, reasoning that an insufficient
nexus existed between that claim and the plaintiff's federal claim. Id. See generally UMW
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
Additionally, the court granted the defendants' request for denial of the plaintiff's statutory damages and attorney's fees claims under the 1976 Act. See 17 U.S.C. § .504(c) (1982)
(statutory damages); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1982) (costs and attorney's fees). The court reasoned
that the works were not registered in a timely manner, a prerequisite for such awards under
17 U.S.C. § 412 (1982) (requiring registration as "prerequisite to certain remedies for infringement"). Johnson, 606 F. Supp. at 324-25.
179. 626 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
180. The plaintiffs included the Illinois Department of Commerce and Community Affairs, its director, and a private advertising agency whose work product was subject to review by the agency. Id. at 501 & n.1.
181. Additionally, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the state's use of the slogan
in question was not a violation of the defendant's federal and state law rights. Id. at 501.
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seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, costs, and attorney's
fees. 182 The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois held that the eleventh amendment bars suit against the
state agency. 18 3
Citing Mills Music, 8 4 the defendant first argued that Congress
intended the 1976 Act to abrogate the states' constitutional immunity. The court, however, determined that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon'8 5 raised
questions about Mills Music's continued validity.8 6 While the
Mills Music court found that the language "any person [who infringes]" showed statutory intent to include the states among possible defendants, 8 7 the Woelffer court noted that Atascadero required the states' specific inclusion in the defendant class.' 8 8 The
court concluded that the general designation of the 1976 Act,
"[a]nyone" who infringes a copyright,18 9 is not sufficient to show
congressional intent to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity. 9 0
Again citing Mills Music, the defendant argued that regardless
182. Under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982 & Supp. II 1984), the defendant also alleged false designation of origin or false description, see id. § 1125(a), and
presented various pendant state law claims. The plaintifs counterclaim did not seek money
damages. Woelffer, 626 F. Supp. at 501 n.1.
183. Woelffer, 626 F. Supp. at 505.
Before discussing the issue of abrogation of eleventh amendment immunity, the court
first addressed the question of whether the state had voluntarily consented to a countersuit
against it by seeking declaratory relief in federal court. Citing Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984), the court concluded that the eleventh amendment barred suit against the agency director because the state was the real, substantial
party in interest. Woelffer, 626 F. Supp. at 501. The court ruled that while the state's request for declaratory relief constituted consent to federal suit for similar relief, the state's
suit did not mean that it waived its immunity regarding the injunction or the attorney's fees
and costs sought by the plaintiff. Id. at 503.
184. 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979); see supra notes 133-48 and accompanying text.
The defendant also maintained that Congress intended to nullify the states' immunity
under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
185. 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985); see supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
186. The court noted that Mihalek rejected the Mills Music court's analysis. Woelfier,
626 F. Supp. at 503 n.5.
187. See Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1284-85; supra notes 140-41.
188. "The watershed principle . . . in Atascadero governs . . . . The sweeping language employed by Congress arguably includes states within the class of . . . infringers
....
The general authorization for suit in federal court against 'anyone' who infringes a
copyright. . . is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment." Woelffer, 626 F. Supp. at 504; see Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3149.
189. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
190. For the same reason, the court held that the cause of action under the Lanham
Act against "[a]ny person" who falsely represents or falsely designates the origin of goods or
services in interstate commerce, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982), does not abrogate the states'
immunity. Woelffer, 626 F. Supp. at 504.
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of statutory intent, the eleventh amendment is subordinate to the
copyright and patent clause."9 Thus, the defendant contended,
any copyright statute passed pursuant to this constitutional clause
inherently would nullify a state's constitutional immunity. 192 Unlike the Mills Music court, however, the Woelf/er court refused to
extend the Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer' 93 holding beyond the context of a
statute passed pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
Absent the state's consent to suit or implied waiver of immunity,
the court would not find abrogation of eleventh amendment immunity merely because Congress enacted a copyright statute. 194
Therefore, the court concluded that the eleventh amendment
barred the defendant's counterclaims for an injunction and attorney's fees. The court, however, did permit injunctive relief against
future infringement by state officials.' 95
D.

Cardinal Industries, Inc. v. Anderson Parrish Associates, Inc.
In Cardinal Industries, Inc. v. Anderson Parrish Associates,
9
Inc. ' the plaintiff claimed that officials of a Florida state university infringed its copyrighted architectural plans for a student
housing project. 97 The university's officials, who sought summary
191. See Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1278; supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
192. Woelfer, 626 F. Supp. at 504.
193. 427 U.S. 445 (1976); see supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
194. "Congress did not enact the [19761 Act pursuant to its flexible Fourteenth
Amendment powers. This fact obviously cuts against defendant's argument of Congressional
abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment." Woelffer, 626 F. Supp. at 505 n.9.
The court noted that the Supreme Court recently had assumed, only for purposes of
argument, that the reasoning of the Mills Music court had been correct. See County of
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 252 (1985); supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text. The Woelffer court, however, characterized the Court's discussion of Mills Music
as "inconsequential dictum . . . completely superceded by the subsequent comprehensive
analysis is [sic] Atascadero." Woelfler, 626 F. Supp. at 504 n.8; see Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at
3150; supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text. But see Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546, 560 (1973) (holding that "[w]hen Congress grants an exclusive right or monopoly, its
effects are pervasive; no citizen or State may escape its reach").
Similarly, the Woelffer court held that "[blecause the Lanham Act was enacted under
the Commerce Clause, [the subordination] argument is inapposite to defendant's false
description claim." Woelffer, 626 F. Supp. at 504 n.7.
195. Woelfer, 626 F. Supp. at 505 (citing, inter alia, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974)); see supra note 79 and accompanying text. The court ruled, however, that an attorney's fees award would be a state treasury expense barred by the eleventh amendment. In
addition, the court ruled that the plaintiff advertising agency did not derivatively enjoy
immunity as an agent of the state. Woelffer, 626 F. Supp. at 506.
196. No. 83-1038-Civ-T-13, slip op. (M.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 1985), aff'd, No. 86-3354 (11th
Cir. Jan. 27, 1987) (per curiam).
197. A Florida architectural firm and certain of its employees and officers also were
named as defendants. See Brief on Appeal of Appellant, at 2, CardinalIndus., No. 86-3354.
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judgment denying the plaintiff's request for monetary and injunctive relief, claimed eleventh amendment immunity.19 8
Reasoning that the state university was the real and substantial party in interest,'99 the court stated that the eleventh amendment would protect the nominal officials unless the university had
waived this protection or Congress had abrogated the state's eleventh amendment immunity.20 0 The panel concluded that "[a] review of the statutes and claims involved in this suit convinces this
Court that the Eleventh Amendment protection has neither been
waived nor abrogated."2 '0 Thus, the court granted the officials' motion for summary judgment as a matter of law.20 2 Significantly, the
CardinalIndustries court neither cited nor discussed the split of
authority in the federal courts. 203 Furthermore, the court discussed
neither the Supreme Court's recent Atascadero opinion nor the
"statutes" that the court claimed it had reviewed.2 0 4 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dis20 5
trict court's decision without discussion.
The court denied the motion of these defendants for summary judgment. CardinalIndus.,
No. 83-1038-Civ-T-13, slip op. at 2. The plaintiff, who also claimed unfair competition, was
an Ohio real estate firm whose business included the manufacture and construction of modular housing units. Id. at 4.
198. Cardinal Indus., No. 83-1038-Civ-T-13, slip op. at 2-3. "Although named in their
individual capacities, the defendants contend that they were working within the scope of
their official capacities as the Director of Housing and as a member of the Office of the
Facility Planning ... at the University of South Florida .... ." Id. at 2.
In addition to money damages and injunctive relief, the plaintiff also sought destruction
of the university's materials that infringed the plaintiff's architectural plans. Id. at 4; see 17
U.S.C. § 503 (1982) ("Remedies for infringement: Impounding and disposition of infringing
articles").
199. Cardinal Indus., No. 83-1038-Civ-T-13, slip op. at 4 (citing Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Scanlon, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984)).
200. Cardinal Indus., No. 83-1038-Civ-T-13, slip op. at 5 (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108
U.S. 436 (1883) (waiver of immunity) and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (abrogation of immunity)).
201. CardinalIndus., No. 83-1038-Civ-T-13, slip op. at 5. "Before a court will subject
a state or its instrumentalities to suit in a federal court, state consent or congressional abrogation must be 'unequivocally expressed'." Id. (quoting Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99).
202. Cardinal Indus., No. 83-1038-Civ-T-13, slip op. at 5. The court stated that a ruling on the defendants' additional claim of protection under common law sovereign immunity was unnecessary. Id.
203. See supra notes 122-95 and accompanying text.
204. Cardinal Indus., Inc. v. Anderson Parrish Assocs., Inc., No. 83-1038-Civ-T-13, slip
op. (M.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 1985), afl'd, No. 86-3354 (11th Cir. Jan. 27, 1987) (per curiam).
205. Cardinal Indus., Inc. v. Anderson Parrish Assocs., Inc., No. 86-3354 (11th Cir.
Jan. 27, 1987) (per curiam).
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E. Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford University
In the most recent federal district court case addressing the
issue, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia, only one year after deciding Johnson, reached a different
20 6
result. In Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford University
the plaintiff sued a state university under the 1976 Act, claiming
copyright infringement of photographs made for the institution's
student prospectus. 2 0 7 The plaintiff sought money damages, claiming that the university subsequently used the photographs in other
publications without authority.20 8 The defendants claimed eleventh
amendment immunity.
The Anderson court first considered the issue of unilateral
congressional abrogation of eleventh amendment immunity. The
court held that Congress, acting pursuant to the copyright and patent clause, did not have the power to abrogate the states' constitutional immunity without the states' consent.0 9 Citing Atas206. 633 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Va. 1986).
207. The university contracted with a design organization, which in turn retained the
plaintiff to make the photographs. Although the plaintiff did not register his copyrights
until after the alleged infringements occurred, see 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1982) ("Registration as
prerequisite to certain remedies for infringement"), the court noted that § 412(2) provides a
three month grace period in which to register. Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1156 & n.2.
In addition to the university, the defendants included the institution's Director of Public Relations and Information and the institution's governing body. Id. at 1155, 1160. The
court held that the university was an "arm of the state" for purposes of the eleventh amendment and, thus, enjoyed whatever immunity the state enjoyed. Id. at 1158 & n.10.
In a footnote the court stated that "[ijnsofar as Wihtol [v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir.
1962)] held that local school districts are 'arms of the state' for the purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment . . .it may have been incorrectly decided." Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1160
n.14 (citing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977)
(holding that unless state law so provides, school districts are not "arms of the state")); see
supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text. The court noted that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment applies only to States and agencies and instrumentalities of the States, not to subdivisions such as municipalities and counties." Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1160 n.14 (citing,
inter alia, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978)); see Lincoln
County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (holding that eleventh amendment does not bar suit
for money damages against school district); Atascadero, 105 S.Ct. at 3155 n.8 (stating that
"the Eleventh Amendment is not a bar to suits against local governmental units") (citing
Lincoln County, 133 U.S. at 530); Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
school district liable for copyright infringement).
208. Initially, the plaintiff also sought injunctive relief. However, because the university returned his photographs after he filed the complaint, the plaintiff dropped that request. Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1156.
209. Id. at 1158. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument, supported by Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1285, and Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973), that "the States
have no sovereignty, and thus no immunity, when Congress acts pursuant to one of Article
I's enumerated powers, such as the Copyright and Patent Clause." Anderson, 633 F. Supp.
at 1158 n.9. The court found Goldstein "inapposite because it deals not with the issue of
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cadero210 and Fitzpatrick,211 the court reasoned that the Supreme

Court recognized this power only when Congress acts pursuant to
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.1 2 Thus, the court focused
not on whether Congress had abrogated the states' immunity, but
213
on whether the state had waived its immunity.
Finding no evidence of express waiver, 1 4 the Anderson court
examined whether the State of Virginia, by operating the university, impliedly consented to suit in federal court. The court used a
two-part test, first determining whether the 1976 Act authorized
suits against "a class of defendants which literally includes
states. '21 5 Citing the interpretation of statutory language in Mills
Music21 6 and Johnson,21 7 the court held that the general authoriza-

tion in the 1976 Act for suit against "anyone" who infringes is
broad enough to include states.21 8
In the second part of its waiver analysis, the court examined
whether the state had given an "unequivocal indication" of consent
to federal court suit.2 "19 Holding that the state had not impliedly

waived its eleventh amendment immunity, the court decided that
the circumstances did not indicate clearly the state's intent.220 The
court determined that in cases finding implied waiver of eleventh
amendment immunity, states generally were faced with the choice
of whether to act, usually in the context of accepting or rejecting a
benefit provided by a federal statute or program. The court stated
that "when it appears from the context of the federal statute
granting the benefit that receipt of the benefit by the State is conditioned upon its surrender of its Eleventh Amendment immunity,
the courts find that the State's actions constituted a waiver of its
Eleventh Amendment immunity, but with the issue of federal preemption of the copyright
field." Id.
210. 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985); see supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
211. 427 U.S. 445 (1976); see supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
212. Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1158.
213. Id.
214. Id. "A State may, for example, expressly waive its constitutional immunity by a
state statute or constitutional provision." Id. at 1157 (citing Atascadero, 105 S.Ct. at 3145
n.1, 3147); see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. See generally Note, supra note 10.
215. Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1157 (quoting Edelman, 415 U.S. at 672).
216. 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979); see supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
217. 606 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Va. 1985); see supra notes 162-78 and accompanying text.
218. Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1159.
219. Id. at 1157 (quoting Atascadero, 105 S.Ct. at 3145 n.1). "Before a State can be
found to have impliedly waived its immunity, its intent to do so must clearly appear from
the circumstances." Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1159.
220. Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1159.
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immunity.
The Anderson court noted that the first implied waiver case,
Parden v. Terminal Railway,2 22 is difficult to reconcile with later
Supreme Court cases that seemingly demonstrate a "greater reluctance" to find implied waiver. 22 Distinguishing the cases, however,
the court noted that the operation of the railroad in Parden was
less of a traditional state function than the administration of Social Security funds in Edelman v. Jordan22 4 and the participation
in a program for the handicapped in Atascadero.22 The court suggested that in Pardenthe Supreme Court was more willing to imply waiver because "there was less compulsion for [the state] to
choose to operate a railroad that [sic] there would have been had it
been dealing with a more basic and fundamental function of the

State. ,,226
Examining the instant facts, the court noted that the state
function of operating a university necessarily requires the daily use
of federally protected copyrights. Because the state, in carrying out
this traditional governmental function, effectively was compelled
to use copyrighted works, the court reasoned that the state's activities were analogous to the activities in Edelman and Atascadero,
cases in which waiver was not implied. 2 7 Therefore, finding no im221. Id. "Such was the situation in Parden and the Supreme Court held that by
choosing to operate a railroad in interstate commerce the state of Alabama had ... impliedly waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity." Id.
222. 377 U.S. 184 (1964); see supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
223. Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1159 & n.12 (citing Welch v. State Dep't of Highways
and Pub. Transp., 780 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (noting that later cases, including
Atascadero, have limited the broad sweep of Parden),cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 58 (1986)).
224. 415 U.S. 651 (1974); see supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
225. Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1160. The court noted that the distinction between
"governmental" and "proprietary" state functions had been rejected in the context of the
tenth amendment. Id. at 1160 n.13 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)). Assuming that the distinction also was no longer valid in the
eleventh amendment context, the court nonetheless believed that an examination of the
state function in Anderson was helpful in determining "the degree of compulsion that a
State was under to furnish a particular service or to accept a given benefit." Anderson, 633
F. Supp. at 1160 n.13.
226. Id. at 1160.
227. Id. The court declared that the state function of operating a university "per force
requires almost daily decision-making with regard to matters governed by Acts of Congress,
including the use of property rights created by the copyright law." Id.
While the plaintiff argued that Johnson, decided by the same court the preceding year,
was dispositive of the issue, the court stated that Johnson, in which waiver was implied,
would have been decided differently in light of the subsequent Atascadero holding. "Atascadero imposes a more stringent standard than had been used in the past by requiring
courts to find an 'unequivocal indication' of a State's consent to be sued in federal court."
Id.; see supra text accompanying note 118.
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plied waiver of eleventh amendment
immunity, the court granted
228
the university's motion to dismiss.

IV.

ANALYSIS

In a copyright infringement suit against a state, the issue to be
resolved is whether the state has waived or Congress has abrogated
the state's eleventh amendment immunity. In Parden v. Terminal
Railway229 the Supreme Court suggested, although somewhat ambiguously, an appropriate three step analysis23 0 for determining
implied waiver First, does Congress have the power to abrogate
the state's common law sovereign immunity? 23' Second, does the
relevant statute indicate congressional intent to condition the
state's right to enter a federally regulated activity upon the state's
consent to suit in federal court?23 2 Last, in light of this congressional power and intent, does the state's subsequent or continued
activity in the federally regulated area imply waiver of its eleventh
amendment immunity? 233 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer2 34 and Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon23 5 call for an additional inquiry: Does
Congress have the constitutional power and statutory intent to
unilaterally abrogate constitutional immunity and, thus, remove
the requirement of state consent? Federal courts have answered
these questions inconsistently in copyright infringement cases.2 38
228. The court held that the university's governing body enjoyed the same immunity
as the university. Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1160. To the extent that the suit was directed
against the public relations director in her official capacity, the court ruled that she also
enjoyed constitutional immunity, reasoning that the state was the real party in interest. Id.
(citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 & n.11 (1984) (holding that the state is a real party in interest when "the judgment sought would expend itself
on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration, or if the effect
of the judgment would be to restrain the Government from acting, or compel it to act")).
The court, however, left open the possibility that the director might be personally liable. Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1161.
Finally, the court granted the plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint to allege the
state's unlawful taking of property in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The court
invited counsel to submit briefs "on the applicability of Eleventh Amendment immunity to
this constitutional claim." Id.
229. 377 U.S. 184, 187, 192 (1964); see supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
230. See Note, supra note 10, at 520 n. 44; cf. Comment, supra note 10, at 958-59
(suggesting a similar two step analysis).
231. See supra note 42 for a discussion of the distinction between common law sovereign immunity and eleventh amendment immunity.
232. See Parden,377 U.S. at 187, 192.
233. See id. at 192.
234. 427 U.S. 445 (1976); see supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
236. 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985); see supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
236. Compare Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979) with Woelf-
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CongressionalPower to Abrogate Common Law Sovereign
Immunity

When considered without reference to the eleventh amendment, the copyright and patent clause gives Congress sufficiently
broad power to abrogate the states' common law sovereign immunity.23 7 In granting Congress the constitutional power to regulate
copyright protection, the states surrendered any part of their sovereignty that would interfere with that regulation. 23 8 As the
Parden Court noted, "The sovereign power of the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of the grants of power to the federal
2 4 ° which concerned
government. ' 239 In Goldstein v. California,
federal preemption of state copyright protection, the Supreme Court
declared that "the States cannot exercise a sovereign power which,
under the Constitution, they have relinquished to the Federal Government for its exclusive exercise . . . . When Congress grants an
exclusive right or monopoly, its effects are pervasive; no citizen or
' 24
State may escape its reach. 1
Thus, because the cause of action created in the 1909 and 1976
Acts is within the congressional copyright power, common law sovereign immunity does not bar application of the Acts against infringing states.24 2 The Constitution, however, may prescribe limitations on Congress' copyright power to nullify the state's immunity
from suit.243 The eleventh amendment's prohibition of infringement suits in federal court against nonconsenting states acts as
such a limitation.
Absent express waiver of this immunity, a
fer v. Happy States of America, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
237. See Comment, supra note 10, at 947 n.121 (stating that "[tihe power of Congress
to lift the common law immunity of the states is not questioned") (citing Parden, 377 U.S.
at 198 (White, J., dissenting)).
238. Cf. Parden,377 U.S. at 191-92 (holding that "(b]y empowering Congress to regulate commerce. . . the States necessarily surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that
would stand in the way of such regulation").
239. Id. (quoting United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184 (1936)).
240. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
241. Id. at 552, 560, quoted in Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1285; see supra note 146 and
accompanying text.
242. Cf. Parden, 377 U.S. at 192 (holding that "[slince imposition of the FELA right
of action upon interstate railroads is within the congressional regulatory power, it must follow that application of the Act to [the state run] railroad cannot be precluded by sovereign
immunity").
243. Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824) (declaring that "[the
commerce] power, like all others vested in congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised
to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the
constitution").
244. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see also Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1283, 1286.
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state still might impliedly consent to a federal court infringement

suit.
B.

CongressionalIntent

The next question under the Parden analysis is whether the
1909 and 1976 Acts show congressional intent to abrogate eleventh
amendment immunity by conditioning a state's participation in
the copyright field upon amenability to federal court suit.245 Traditionally, analysis of congressional intent required an examination
of the statutory language and legislative history to determine
whether Congress meant to include states within the class of potential defendants when it created a cause of action.24 1 The Supreme Court's pronouncements on this issue, however, have been
inconsistent.4 7
In Parden248 the FELA249 created a cause of action against
"every common carrier by railroad" engaged in interstate commerce.25 The Supreme Court found this language sufficiently
broad to authorize federal suit against the state.2 51 The Court reasoned that, absent express language to the contrary, it should not
presume congressional intent to exclude states from the statute's
reach.25 2
In Employees v. Departmentof Public Health and Welfare,25s
however, the Court reversed the presumption of congressional intent to subject the states to suit. The Employees Court held that
"Congress, acting responsibly, would not be presumed to take such
245. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 192.
246. See id. at 187-90; Employees v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S.
279, 285 (1973); Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3147-49; see also Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1284 n.7
(stating that "[t]he class of defendants intended by Congress must be ascertained from the
language of the statute, the legislative history of the statute, and the context in which it
applies.").
247. See cases cited supra note 246. For a general discussion of the rules of statutory

construction, see C. D.

SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

(9th ed. 1975).

248. 377 U.S. 184 (1964). In Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (1962), decided before
Parden, the court did not discuss the possibility of implied waiver of eleventh amendment
immunity. See supra note 132.
249. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982); see supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
250. 45 U.S.C. at §§ 51, 56 (1982); see Parden, 377 U.S. at 185-86.
251. Parden, 377 U.S. at 187 (stating that "[w]e think that Congress, in making the
FELA applicable to 'every' common carrier by railroad in interstate commerce, meant what
it said"); id. at 189 (recognizing that "[t]he fact that Congress chose to phrase the coverage
of the [FELA] in all-embracing terms indicates that state railroads were included within it")
(quoting California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 564 (1957)).
252. Parden, 377 U.S. at 189-90.
253. 411 U.S. 279 (1973); see supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
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action silently. '254 Although the defendant class under the FLSA
included "any employer" who violated the statute, the Court found
that this language and the legislative history of the FLSA did not
refer to the states.2 55 Thus, the Employees Court significantly narrowed the Parden holding by ruling that congressional intent to
nullify constitutional immunity must be apparent from the "clear
language" of the statute. 5 6 Specifically, the Court stated that in
the context of the statutory language and the legislative history,
2 57
the words "any employer" did not evince this intent.
In Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona25 8 the Ninth Circuit noted the
"sharp contrast" 25 between Pardenand Employees, but chose not
to follow Employees' presumption in favor of immunity. The court
found that the 1909 Act authorized suit against "any person [who]
shall infringe," using language apparently as broad and indefinite
as the "any employer" language in Employees.260 The court, however, stated that in ascertaining congressional intent, a court
should examine "the language of the statute in the context of the
activity regulated. '2 1 The court determined that a narrow construction of statutory intent was necessary in Employees because
Congress, acting under its broad commerce power, potentially
could have placed a great burden on the state treasury. 62 The
court, however, reasoned that because the potential financial burden to states would be minimal when Congress acts pursuant to its
narrow copyright power, a less strict statutory construction of congressional intent was possible. 26 Thus, in Mills Music the court
found that broad statutory language weighed against immunity,
even though the Supreme Court in Employees previously con254. Employees, 411 U.S. at 284-85; see supra notes 68-72.
255. Employees, 411 U.S. at 285; see 52 Stat. 1069 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-19 (1982)).
256. Employees, 411 U.S. at 285.
257. Id. at 283-85. The Court noted that, unlike the FELA in Parden,the FLSA mandated double compensation for successful claimants, potentially creating large fiscal burdens
for the states. Id. at 284.
In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the Court held that a statute that does not
expressly create a cause of action shows no congressional intent to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity. Id. at 674.
258. 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979); see supra notes 133-48 and accompanying text.
259. Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1283 (quoting Riggle v. California, 577 F.2d 579, 583
(9th Cir. 1978)).

260. Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1284-85; see supra note 141 and accompanying text.
261. Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1284-85.
262.

Id. at 1285.

263. Id.

260
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cluded differently. 26 4
In Johnson v. University of Virginia26 5 a Virginia federal
court accepted the Mills Music rationale. Examining the 1976 Act,
the court held that the defendant class, defined as "anyone [who]
infringes," was at least as broad as the "any person [who] infringes" definition of the defendant class contained in the 1909 Act
and, therefore, evidenced an intent to include the states.266 The
Johnson court assumed, contrary to Employees but in accord with
26 7
Mills Music, that the broad language weighed against immunity.

Subsequently, in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon2ss the
Supreme Court appears to have settled the uncertainty concerning
congressional intent. The Court required that congressional intent,
in order to make states amenable to suit, must be shown to specifically include the states in the statute's defendant class. 6 9 Thus,
the Court appeared to reaffirm the spirit of Employees by demanding that Congress, when desiring to include states in the defendant class, make an express inclusion.7 0 In Richard Anderson
Photography v. Radford University27" the court incorrectly disregarded the Supreme Court's presumption in favor of immunity
and, instead, relied on the discredited rationale of Mills Music and
Johnson to find the statutory defendant class "sufficiently broad
to include the States. 2 72 Despite the court's incorrect reasoning,
however, the Anderson court reached the correct conclusion on the
issue of congressional intent.
Atascadero does not prohibit a search of all relevant statutory
language in defining the defendant class. 7 Although the 1909 and
1976 Acts do not explicitly include states as potential defendants,
the Acts, read as a whole, indicate that Congress specifically intended to include the states in the defendant class.2 7 Both Acts
create specific exemptions from infringement suits for certain uses
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
gan, 595

See supra notes 242-46 and accompanying text.
606 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Va. 1985); see supra notes 162-78 and accompanying text.
Johnson, 606 F. Supp. at 323-24; see 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
Johnson, 606 F. Supp. at 324; see supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985).
Id. at 3149; see supra text accompanying note 117.
Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3149.
633 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Va. 1986).
Id. at 1159.
See Supplemental Brief on Appeal of Amici Curiae at 12, Mihalek Corp. v. MichiF. Supp. 903 (E.D. Mich. 1984), appeal docketed, No. 85-1593 (6th Cir. July 23,

1985)(stating that "nowhere does the Atascadero opinion limit the inquiry to a single section of the Copyright Act.").
274.

See, e.g., Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1284 n.7; supra note 246.

1987]

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

of copyrighted works by various parties, including state agencies. 275
For example, the 1976 Act provides that unauthorized importation
of copies of works acquired outside the United States constitutes
copyright infringement.176 The Act, however, generally exempts the
"importation of copies or phonorecords under the authority or for
the use of. . .any State or political subdivision of a State. '277 One
plaintiff argued that "the exemptions and exceptions carefully
carved out by Congress would not be necessary if Congress did not
clearly intend the States and their political subdivisions be subject
to the [1976] Act. '2 78 Assuming that this statutory language is not
superfluous, Congress evidently intended states to be immune from
copyright suits in federal court only when Congress specifically
provides a statutory exemption.2 9 Thus, by the text's negative implication, which leaves "no room for any other reasonable construction," 6 " the states have been included in the defendant class
of both Acts with sufficient specificity to evince clear congressional
intent.
275. "The [1976] Act . . . contains at least seven express exemptions from suit for
infringement for state agencies, applicable in specific, narrowly defined circumstances
. . . ." Supplemental Brief on Appeal of Amici Curiae at 6, Mihalek, No. 85-1593; see 17
U.S.C. §§ 107 ("Limitation of exclusive rights: Fair use"); 110(6) ("Limitations on exclusive
rights: Exemption of certain performances and displays"); 111(a) ("Limitations on exclusive
rights: Secondary transmissions"); 112(b) ("Limitations on exclusive rights: Ephemeral recordings"); 118(d)(3) ("Scope of exclusive rights: Use of certain works in connection with
noncommercial broadcasting"); 601(b) ("Manufacture, importation, and public distribution
of certain copies"); 602(a) ("Infringing importation of copies or phonorecords") (1982).
Similarly, the 1909 Act exempts from its importation prohibition the good faith use of
one copy of a book by, among other institutions, "any State, school, college, university, or
free public library in the United States." See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
276.

See 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1982).

277.

Id. § 602(a)(1).

278.

Appellants' Brief on Appeal at 15, Mihalek, No. 85-1593.

279. See id. at 14. One can argue, however, that to the extent that these provisions
protect local school districts and local and county governments, which are not immune from
federal court suit under the eleventh amendment, see supra note 207, the specific statutory
exemptions are not superfluous. See supra notes 275-78 and accompanying text.
280.
(1974)).

Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3146 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673

Professor Nimmer has stated that "since nothing in the Copyright Act purports to immunize state entities from liability, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution prevents state
impairment of this federal law. This principle has been expressly invoked in copyright cases

not involving the sovereign immunity issue." 3 M.
§ 121.01[E][2][a], at 12-19 (1986).

NiMMER,

NIMMER ON
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Implied Waiver

Because the 1909 and 1976 Acts meet the specificity test of
Atascadero, the only remaining question under the three-part
Parden analysis is whether a state, by its actions, impliedly has
consented to suit in federal court. In Pardenthe Court held that,
given congressional intent to nullify eleventh amendment immunity, the state's subsequent activity in the regulated area of interstate commerce implied the requisite consent to federal jurisdiction." 1 Similarly, the Mills Music court found implied waiver of
constitutional immunity by the state's entry "in[to] an activity
regulated by federal [copyright] law. '282 An examination of the relevant facts and language in later cases, however, indicates that the
Mills Music rationale is of doubtful validity for two reasons. The
issue centers on when "engaging" in the federally regulated activity of copyright use constitutes voluntary submission to federal
2 83
jurisdiction.
First, as the Anderson court recently noted, the Supreme
Court requires that "an unequivocal indication" of implied consent
to federal suit "clearly appear from the circumstances. ' 284 A state's
use of copyrighted works-the federal activity in which it engages-does not "clearly" and "unequivocally" evince this consent.
The Anderson court declared that for a state's actions truly to im'285
ply consent, the state "must have had a choice to act or not act.
The court correctly concluded that the states, as a practical matter, have no choice but to utilize copyrighted material in carrying
out the basic functions of government.8 6 Congress could not effectively prevent the states from using those materials; the workings
of state government quickly would grind to a halt if Congress could
prevent the availability of copyrighted works such as books, films,
computer software, and maps. For this reason, the necessary use of
these works in carrying out state governmental functions fundamentally differs from the discretionary operation of a railroad, the
activity from which the Parden Court first implied waiver.8 7
281. Parden, 377 U.S. at 192-93; see supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
282. Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1283, 1286; see supra note 142 and accompanying text.
283. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 193 & n.11.
284. Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1159 (citing Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3145 n.1).
285. Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1159.
286. Id. at 1159-60.
287. In his concurrence in Employees v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411
U.S. 279 (1973), Justice Marshall said, "To suggest that the State had the choice of either
ceasing operation of these vital public services or 'consenting' to federal suit suffices ... to
demonstrate that the State had no true choice at all and thereby that the State did not
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Second, the cases following Parden have limited the factual
settings in which waiver will be implied. Although Parden concerned permission to operate a railroad, the Anderson court observed that implied waiver cases usually arise in the narrow context "of a state's accepting or rejection of a federally provided
benefit."2 " In Atascadero the Supreme Court noted that a state
may consent to federal court suit either expressly "or by otherwise
waiving its immunity to suit in the context of a particular federal
program.

' 289

Thus, the Court appears implicitly to have limited

Parden, suggesting that waiver of constitutional immunity in the
future would be implied only when a state accepts, under a federal
program, a benefit that Congress could have withheld. Because a
state's use of copyrighted works does not fall within this narrow
context, consent to federal court suit cannot be implied under
Atascadero.290 The Mills Music and Johnson v. University of Vir-

ginia2 91 rationale, therefore, no longer is valid. A state does not impliedly waive its constitutional immunity from infringement suits
in exchange for the availability of copyrighted works. 92
voluntarily consent to the exercise of federal jurisdiction." Id. at 296 (Marshall, J., concurring); see Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1157 n.6 (requiring that a "State's consent must not be
illusory").
288. Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1159; see Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3142 (federal financial assistance under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
t1974) (federal funding under AABD). The Anderson court noted that "Pardenis difficult
to reconcile with some of the Court's later cases. . . which seem to evidence a greater reluctance on the part of the Court to find an implied waiver." Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1159;
see Welch v. State Dep't of Highways and Transp., 780 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (holding broad sweep of Pardenlimited by later Supreme Court opinions, including Atascadero),
cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 58 (1986); Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1159 n.12.
289. Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 1435 n.1. Significantly, in Atascadero the Supreme
Court did not cite Parden in its discussion of implied consent. See id. at 3149-50.
290. But see Supplemental Brief on Appeal of Amici Curiae at 7, Mihalek, No. 851593 (urging that "[t]here is . . . a world of difference between a state's passive receipt of
federal funds and a state's active infringement of a copyright. . . . The former may well be
found not [sic] imply a waiver of immunity, while the latter surely does constitute 'purposeful activity' implying waiver").
291. 606 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Va. 1985); see supra notes 162-78 and accompanying text.
The Johnson court accepted the Mills Music rationale.
292. See Parden,377 U.S. at 192. One can argue, however, that a state instrumentality
that not only uses a copyrighted work without authority, but also attempts to register the
work as its own, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 408-412 (1982) (covering registration of copyrights), may
have impliedly waived constitutional immunity; an infringer's registration arguably is analogous to Parden'srequirement of participation in a federally regulated activity, see supra
note 64 and accompanying text. Telephone conversation with Frank R. Jakes, attorney with
Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings & Evans, Tampa, Fla. (Nov. 26, 1986).
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D. Unilateral Congressional Abrogation of Eleventh
Amendment Protection
Absence of implied consent does not always preclude suits
against the states in federal court. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 9 3 the
Supreme Court held that a statute passed pursuant to the fourteenth amendment could subject states to suit in federal court because the eleventh amendment is inherently subordinate to the
fourteenth amendment.1 4 Thus, in the context of fourteenth
amendment legislation, state consent to federal jurisdiction is unnecessary if a plaintiff sufficiently demonstrates congressional intent to nullify constitutional immunity.
The Mills Music court, extending the sui generis Fitzpatrick
holding beyond its fourteenth amendment context, stated that the
eleventh amendment also is inherently subordinate to the copyright and patent clause.29 If the court's determinations were valid,
inquiry into state consent to federal infringement suits also would
be unnecessary as long as statutory intent to allow these infringement suits existed. The requisite congressional intent to include
states in the defendant class is specified sufficiently in both the
1909 and 1976 Acts.296
Because, however, the Supreme Court expressly limited its
Fitzpatrick holding to statutes passed pursuant to the fourteenth
amendment,2 9 7 Mills Music's expansive reading appears to be
"constitutionally impermissible. ' 29" The Woelffer v. Happy States
of America, Inc.299 court noted this probability. In County of
00 the Supreme Court cited the
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nations
Mills Music holding on congressional abrogation of eleventh
amendment immunity, but refused to decide whether the Mills
Music rationale was correct.30 1 Thus, the Court left open the possibility that congressional intent and statutory violation alone were

293. 427 U.S. 445 (1976); see supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
294. Id. at 456; see supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text. In Johnson v. University of
Virgina, 606 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Mich. 1985), the court accepted the Mills Music reasoning
without discussing Fitzpatrick.See id. at 322-24.
296. See supra notes 245-80 and accompanying text.
297. Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 456.
298. See id.
299. 626 F. Supp. 499, 503-05 (N.D. Il. 1985); see supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
300. 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
301. Id. at 252; see supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
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sufficient in infringement suits to force a state into federal court.30 2
More recently, however, the Atascadero0 s Court reiterated
that Fitzpatrick was limited to legislation passed under the fourteenth amendment.30 4 As the Mihalek and Anderson courts correctly concluded, Congress, acting pursuant to the copyright and
patent clause, has no power to unilaterally abrogate a state's eleventh amendment immunity.30 5 State consent, express or implied,
302. Taken literally, this analysis presents trial courts with the problem of requiring
that the jurisdictional question be answered based on a determination of a state's liability
for a statutory violation. As a practical matter, a federal court obviously cannot find liability
for copyright infringement until it first decides whether it has jurisdiction over the defendant state.
303. 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985).
304. The Court said, "There are. . . certain well-established exceptions to the reach
of the Eleventh Amendment. For example, . . . when acting pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment without the States'
consent." Id. at 3145-46; see supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text. But see Gibbons,
supra note 4, at 2004 (arguing that the Supreme Court should "acknowledg[e] that Congress
can eliminate state immunity with respect to any subject on which it has legislative authority"); Reply Brief on Appeal of Appellant at 18, Cardinal Indus., Inc. v. Anderson Parrish
Assocs., Inc., No. 83-1038-Civ-T-13, slip op. (M.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 1985), aff'd, No. 86-3354
(11th Cir. Jan. 27, 1987) (per curiam) (stating that "[tlhere is no statement in Atascadero
*

.

. which holds. . . that only when Congress is acting pursuant to Sec. 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment may Congress abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity"); supra notes 196-205
and accompanying text.
One commentator notes that the Atascadero holding "was premised on the availability
of state courts to entertain such suits." W. PATRY, supra note 14, at 272 n.70; see Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3146 n.2 (recognizing that "the issue is not the general immunity of the
'States from private suit ... but merely the susceptibility of the States to suit before federal tribunals") (quoting Employees v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S.
279, 293-94 (1973) (Marshall J., concurring in the result)). Because 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)
(1982) gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of copyright suits and prohibits these suits
in state courts, "[a]pplying the Atascadero ... holding to a copyright suit against a state
would. . . result in no forum for infringement of a federal right." W. PATRY, supra note 14,
at 272 n.70. While the question remains whether Congress contemplated and intended such
a result, one party has noted that the Supreme Court apparently has never "upheld an
Eleventh Amendment bar where Congress has granted exclusive federal court jurisdiction."
Supplemental Brief on Appeal of Amici Curiae at 9, Mihalek, No. 85-1593; see infra notes
311-14 and accompanying text.
305. See Mihalek, 595 F. Supp. at 905-06; Anderson, 633 F. Supp. at 1158; cf.
Wolcher, supra note 33, at 207 n.66 (noting arguable theory that "Congress' art. 1 powers
antedate the eleventh amendment and might therefore be seen as having been impliedly
limited by it," and that "unlike the fourteenth amendment. . ., Congress' art. 1 powers do
not 'by their own terms embody limitations on state authority' ") (quoting Fitzpatrick,427
U.S. at 456).
One can argue, however, that state copyright infringement does constitute a fourteenth
amendment violation. The fifth amendment proscription that "private property [shall not]
be taken for public use, without just compensation," US. CONST. amend. V, has been applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). This argument fails, however, because the Supreme
Court has recognized a fourteenth amendment limitation on constitutional immunity only
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remains a necessary ingredient to nullify constitutional immunity
in infringement cases. In addition, consent is not implicit in the
mere violation of a federal copyright statute.3 0 Because state consent to federal jurisdiction is absent, a state's alleged infringement,
without more, does not constitute implied waiver. The eleventh
amendment, therefore, continues to protect states from copyright
infringement suits in federal court.
E. A Proposed Solution
Copyright proponents might argue that because infringement
claims are exclusive to the federal courts, 0 7 the foregoing analysis
would leave owners of works infringed by states a right without a
when Congress expressly limits such protection by "appropriate legislation." See, e.g., Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3145 (quoting Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 456); see also Porter v. United
States, 473 F.2d 1329, 1337 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that "[copyright] infringement is not a
'taking' as the term is constitutionally understood. . . [and that] infringement of copyright
. . . constitutes a tort"). But see Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (holding that patent infringement constituted "unlawful taking"). Alternatively, a potential claim that infringement constitutes a deprivation of civil rights under color of state
law, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), would not override automatically a state's eleventh amendment immunity. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 does not abrogate eleventh amendment immunity). Thus, a claim of "taking" or of a
§ 1983 violation by a state, to be brought in federal court, still might require a finding of
state waiver of constitutional immunity.
However, in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), the Supreme Court ruled that
§ 1983 was available to remedy violations of federal statutory rights by state agents. The
availability of this remedy was limited in a later Supreme Court case. In Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), the Court held that a
comprehensive remedial scheme provided by Congress precludes additional private remedies
under § 1983. The 1976 Act can be viewed as a "comprehensive remedial scheme," thereby
making § 1983 unavailable in copyright infringement suits against states. But see Wright v.
City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 55 U.S.L.W. 4119 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1987)
(No. 85-5915) (holding that the Housing Act and the Brooke Amendment are not sufficiently comprehensive to indicate a congressional intent to preclude § 1983 claims to enforce
tenants' federal statutory rights).
Under Justice Brennan's revisionist interpretation of the eleventh amendment, see
supra note 118, which has not been accepted by a majority of the Court, federal court infringement suits against the states could be brought under a statute passed pursuant to the
copyright and patent clause. Dissenting for a minority of four in Atascadero, Justice Brennan stated that "[i]f federal jurisdiction is based on the existence of a federal question ... ,
the Eleventh Amendment has no relevance. There is thus no Article III limitation on otherwise proper suits against States by citizens, non-citizens, or aliens. . . " Atascadero, 105 S.
Ct. at 3178 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also W. PATRY, supra note 14, at 272 n.70 (stating
that "copyright suits are based on a constitutionalright (Article 1 § 8 cl. 8), ceded by the
states to the federal government and thus cannot be said to 'implicate[] the fundamental
constitutional balance between the Federal government and the states' ") (quoting Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3145-46).
306. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 192; supra notes 273-80 and accompanying text.
307. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982).
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remedy.308 While the Supreme Court in Parden stated that such a
"pointless and frustrating" result would be surprising,3 09 the Employees Court stated that it also would be surprising to infer abrogation of constitutional immunity without a showing of clear congressional intent.31 0 Viewing the 1909 and 1976 Acts in conjunction
with Supreme Court implied immunity holdings, the analyses suggested by Parden, Fitzpatrick, and later cases lead to the conclusion that Congress does not have the power to effect, nor did the
states consent to, abrogation of eleventh amendment protection in
infringement cases. The correct legal analysis, however, does not
necessarily lead to the proper outcome. Copyright protection
against the states remains a legitimate economic concern to
owners.
Two possible judicial and legislative approaches could provide
this protection. Federal courts might follow Mills Music's expansion of the Fitzpatrick holding and find congressional power to
unilaterally nullify the eleventh amendment in the copyright field.
The right to sue infringing states in federal court, however, would
come at a great cost. Allowing federal suit against nonconsenting
states whenever Congress desired would render the eleventh
amendment practically void. This expansion of Fitzpatrick arguably would allow Congress, when acting pursuant to its article I
powers, to unilaterally nullify sections of the Constitution at
will-a clearly unconstitutional result. 1 '
Conversely, eleventh amendment immunity need not preclude
vindication of the copyright owner's rights. Because the 1909 and
1976 Acts have nullified common law sovereign immunity in infringement cases, 12 a copyright claim could be brought in state
court if federal court copyright jurisdiction were no longer exclusive, but merely concurrent with state court jurisdiction. 1 3 In fact,
many states expressly have waived tort liability in state constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions. 31 4 Thus, in order to afford
308.

See, e.g., Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 9-10, Mihalek, No. 85-1593. In addition,

the eleventh amendment remains a bar where federal courts are given exclusive jurisdiction
not by Congress, but by the Constitution itself, as in in rem admiralty cases. See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2; In re State of New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921).

309. Parden, 377 U.S. at 190, 197.
310. Employees, 411 U.S. at 285.
311. See U.S. CONST. art V (detailing procedure for amending U.S. Constitution).
312. See supra notes 237-44 and accompanying text.
313. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982) (containing exclusive federal copyright
jurisdiction).
314. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art II, § 21 (outlining the procedure and requirements
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copyright owners a remedy when their rights are infringed by a
state, Congress need only amend the jurisdictional statute for
3 15
copyright claims.
While exclusive jurisdiction empowering only federal courts to
hear copyright claims may guarantee parties the expertise of a
judge familiar with issues of federal law, state court judges are not
incompetent to hear copyright cases. State courts, for example,
often entertain pendant federal questions.1 6 Although granting
state courts the sole jurisdiction to hear federal copyright claims
against the states appears anomalous, an exception to the jurisdictional statute would provide at least some forum to hear otherwise
unvindicated federal copyright claims.3 17 Theoretically, this solution is more sound than amending the 1976 Act to specifically include states as defendants. In light of current Supreme Court eleventh amendment jurisprudence, a statutory amendment to the
1976 Act would rest upon the incorrect premise that Congress has
the power to abrogate nonconsenting states' eleventh amendment
immunity in the copyright field."1 '
for private suits against the state);

HAWAII REV. STAT.

§§ 662-2, -3 (1984) (granting tort

immunity waiver and vesting state circuit courts with exclusive jurisdiction to entertain
claims); Lockaby v. Wayne County, 406 Mich. 65, 276 N.W.2d 1 (1979) (allowing relief for
intentional torts by the state). See generally Note, supra note 10, at 526-37.
315. One party has argued:
While 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over federal statutory copyright infringement actions, such was not always the case. Prior to 1870 state
courts had concurrent jurisdiction for all copyright infringement lawsuits. Woolsey v.
Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) . . .; see Revised Statutes § 711 (1906);
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 215; Boucicault v. Fox, 3 F. Cas. 977, 981
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 1,691) ("the jurisdiction of the state courts, in suits to protect
the owners of manuscripts, is complete"). Thus, a copyright owner's inability to seek
redress against an infringing state is not the fault of the Eleventh Amendment, but
rather of Congress due to its refusal to grant state courts concurrent jurisdiction.
Brief on Appeal of Appellee at 29, CardinalIndus., No. 86-3354.
Although the success of this tactic appears improbable, a-copyright owner also could
seek passage of a private bill in the state legislature granting compensation for state
infringement.
316. See, e.g., Smith v. Bull Run School Dist. No. 45, 722 P.2d 27, 29 (Ore. App. 1986)
(deciding appeal concerning claims against a school district under federal equal pay statutes, passed pursuant to the commerce clause, which would be barred from federal court by
the eleventh amendment). In addition, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over trademark infringement cases arising under the Lanham Act. See Flagship Real Estate Corp. v.
Flagship Banks, Inc., 374 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); 1 J. GIBSON, TRADEMARK
PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 8.02 (1985).
317. See Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3146 n.2 (stating that "[iut denigrates the judges
who serve on the state courts to suggest that they will not enforce the supreme law of the
land") (citing, inter alia, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat, 304, 341-344 (1816)).
318. See supra notes 293-306 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The recently renewed but judicially unresolved debate concerning copyright protection against infringement by the states
brings into sharp focus the competing values expressed in the eleventh amendment and the copyright and patent clause. The current
proliferation of copyright infringement suits against states requires
timely resolution of the immunity issue. A proper resolution will
serve not only the federal government's interests in promoting
both federalism and individual creativity, but also the copyright
owner's economic interests. One must assume that Congress, by
granting federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear copyright
cases, intended, in light of the eleventh amendment, to preclude
federal court copyright suits against states. Instead of the drastic
course followed in Mills Music, amendment of the jurisdictional
statute would afford copyright owners relief from state infringement while avoiding the otherwise inevitable evisceration of the
eleventh amendment. Accordingly, this Recent Development concludes that Congress should amend 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) to provide
that private individuals may sue infringing states in state court for
copyright infringement. This approach best reconciles the conflict
between a proprietor's interest in his work, protected by the 1909
and 1976 Acts, and the states' immunity from suit in federal court,
guaranteed by the eleventh amendment.
John C. Beiter*
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